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Ownership, value 
and the crisis
The basic facts of the so-called financial 
crisis are well known: the demise 
of Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and 
Lehman Brothers; the government 
protection of AIG, Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae, as well as GM; billions on 
bailouts for the banks. However, what 
has been little considered is the role 
the financial tumult has played in al-
tering the makeup of ownership within 
capitalism. Although many commenta-
tors have criticized the government 
bailout as a form of nationalization, the 
actual structure of ownership and its 
relationship to the valuation of a cor-
poration has gone largely undiscussed. 
Much has been made of the collapse of 
share prices of the big banks. Between 
August, 2007 and February, 2009 both 
Citigroup’s (C) and Bank of America’s 
(BAC) share prices dropped more than 
90 percent. The other two members of 
the Big 4 – JPMorgan Chase (JPM) and 
Wells Fargo (WF) – fared better, but 
both still lost more than 55 percent. 
In addition to the drama of the stock 
market’s treatment of the Big 4’s, the 
media focussed on the US govern-
ment’s intervention with what would 
prove to be the misnamed Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP). Although 
the plan was originally intended to ar-
range for the government to purchase 
the toxic assets no one else would buy, 
the money was used to buy preferred 
shares of the financial intermediar-
ies. However, what was not explored 
was the relationship between the two 
moves, which relates to ownership and 
valuation.
The value assigned to a corpo-
ration, its market capitalization, is 
the present value of expected future 
earnings discounted for the risk that 
expected earnings will not be realized. 
The value will increase either as the 
expected earnings increase or as the as-
sessed risks to those earnings decrease. 
For the financial intermediaries, this 
value is mostly comprised of the loans 
extended to borrowers and the capacity 
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to facilitate financial operations. The 
expectations of earnings and risk asso-
ciated with these assets were reassessed 
as US housing prices levelled off and 
borrower delinquencies began to rise. A 
slow decline accelerated as worst-case 
scenarios were realized. The markets 
for securities backed by mortgages 
seized up and left banks holding what 
had become worthless assets. Despite 
the fact that the overwhelming major-
ity of borrowers continued to make 
their payments, market participants 
fled from mortgage-backed securities. 
With reduced expected earnings and 
increased risk assessment, the capital-
ization of the banks fell. 
Total capitalization is captured 
in the values assigned to all claims on 
future earnings, which can generally 
be classified as either debt or equity. 
Equity is further divided in preferred 
and common shares. The price of 
common shares has garnered the 
public’s attention, but the government 
purchased preferred shares through 
TARP. As the government purchased 
preferred shares, putting forth 
another claim on future earnings, the 
remaining portion of future earnings 
available to holders of common shares 
decreased and the price fell further. 
Did the fall in common equity value 
completely offset the increase in the 
preferred share value? If it did, then 
the change in the structure of owner-
ship had no effect on either expected 
earnings or the assessed risk of the 
financial intermediaries, which is the 
outcome that mainstream economic 
theory would predict. That was not the 
case. As the government bought into 
the corporations the value of common 
equity fell less than the increased value 
of preferred shares. From the first 
quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 
2009, the value of preferred shares for 
the Big 4 increased $174.3 billion. The 
value of common shares fell by $123 
billion, for an overall increase in capi-
talization of $51.3 billion: 2.1 percent 
growth. However, in order to grasp the 
meaning of these quantitative changes 
we need to consider the theory of 
capital as power.
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Figure 2: Setting the market on FIRE: Differential 
 accumulation of FIRE and the Big 4, 1999–2009
DATA: Datastream.
NOTE: Figures represent the cumulative annual growth rate 
for periods demarcated by the vertical line at the third 
quarter of 2007.
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Figure 1: Capitalizing what?
 Comparison of Apple and Kraft
DATA: Property, plant and equipment and  capitalization: 
 10-Qs for first quarter of 2010; Employees: 10-Ks for 
2008. All are available through EDGAR.
NOTE: Figures for employees are the number. Figures of 
property, plant and equipment and capitalization are in 
millions of dollars. The ratios are the figures for Apple 
divided by the figures for Kraft.
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Power, accumulation
and  redistribution
The architecture of capitalism is designed for accumula-
tion. The actual meaning of accumulation is both murky 
and problematic. Advocates and critics of capitalism can be 
distinguished on the basis of what they mean when they talk 
about it. Neoclassical defenders view accumulation as the 
outcome of profit-seeking for hedonic maximization of utility. 
Competition is meant to ensure that all factors of production 
earn returns in proportion to their marginal contributions:1 
wages for labour, interest for capital. Profits are defined as 
earnings greater than marginal contributions and, by defini-
tion, will always be temporary and dissipated by consumption. 
Marxist critics view accumulation as a goal for its own sake, 
and they see it as the exploitative appropriation of a surplus-
value generated by labour. Pecuniary profits are rolled over 
into productive capacity, so that monetary and ‘machine’ 
accumulation act as two sides of the same process. For the 
neoclassicists, utility is the fundamental building block of 
the capitalist architecture. For the Marxists, it is labour-
value. Like Marx, this essay emphasizes accumulation as the 
defining goal of capitalism. However, it follows the theory of 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, who return to the 
importance of ownership and private property in the process 
of accumulation. 
According to Nitzan and Bichler the most important fea-
ture of private ownership that it excludes people other than 
owners from making use of property.2 Accumulation derives 
from an owner’s right to exclude others and from his or her 
“ability to exact terms for not exercising that right.”3 One 
of the features to distinguish capitalism from other social 
orders that included private ownership is the mechanism of 
assessing accumulatory success in quantitative terms: capi-
talization. Capitalization allows a price to be attached to an 
asset based on the earnings it is expected to generate. Capital 
enters when value is assigned to ownership itself rather than 
simply the asset controlled via that ownership. This renders 
ownership divisible and vendible. The owner of an orchard 
need not rely upon each year’s harvest to reap the rewards of 
ownership. Instead, she could sell a portion of the ownership 
of the orchard to someone else who will then share in future 
profit, while the orchard itself remains undivided and in the 
same hands. However, what determines the assessed value of 
the orchard? The standard perspectives claim that the value 
is ultimately dependent on the orchard’s productivity. Nitzan 
and Bichler remind us that the valuation is grounded in the 
fact of ownership and the right of exclusion. If the owner of 
the orchard were unable to prevent anyone who wanted an 
apple from gaining access to the orchard, its effective price 
would be zero. However, once ownership is established, valu-
ation depends on the entire social milieu within which the 
orchard functions. How popular are apples? Is there a stigma 
attached to eating them? How extensive is the transporta-
tion system? None of this can be reduced to either labour 
or productive capacity. Figure 1 compares the employees, 
productive capacity and valuation of Apple Inc. and Kraft 
Foods Inc. The numbers above each set of bars is the ratio 
of Apple to Kraft for that factor. Kraft has almost three times 
as many employees and four times as much property, plants 
and equipment. Yet, Apple’s capitalization is more than 2.5 
times greater. If value and capitalization are determined by 
the complex social environment of the corporation, then 
accumulation depends on altering the social environment, 
which can include the components of the corporation itself. 
For Apple, this means not just improving the productivity of 
its work force but targeting particular high-spending market 
segments, creating a personality cult around CEO Steve Jobs, 
focusing on design aesthetic and much more.
Of course, no corporation is engaged in the struggle to 
change the societies in which it operates without a challenge 
from both other corporations and other members of those 
societies. Achieving that change to one’s own benefit is power. 
Capitalism is not unique in being comprised of a hierarchy of 
combatants seeking to impose their design upon the social 
order. Hence, Nitzan and Bichler argue that every hierarchi-
cal social order is not a mode of production, but a mode of 
power.4 What sets capitalism apart is its use of capitalization 
as a universal determinant of success. However, as a power 
process, capitalization does not have meaning on its own. 
There is no absolute register against which accumulation may 
be judged as successful or unsuccessful. Rather, the ongoing 
change in capitalized value can only be assessed as a matter 
of differential comparison. This means periods of success 
can be realized even in times of crisis, when absolute values 
are falling. If a corporation’s capitalization decreases by 10 
percent when the market as a whole falls by 15 percent, that 
is accumulatory success. At the same time, simply growing 
does not mean a corporation is successful if that growth is 
less than the rest of the market. The business press assumes 
this ‘beating the average’ yardstick as the measure of success. 
With this in mind, we will return to the accumulatory 
trajectory of the Big 4 during the financial crisis. The banks 
grew in absolute terms, but that growth becomes even more 
stunning when considered in differential comparison. While 
the Big 4 grew by 2.1 percent from the first quarter of 2008 to 
the first quarter of 2009, over the same period the total value 
of all publicly traded corporations fell by 24.4 percent. The 
financial intermediaries (FIRE) as a whole fell by 13.6 percent. 
Note that because the market as a whole fell by more than 
FIRE, the financial intermediaries still enjoyed differential 
success over that period. 
A picture of differential success for the Big 4 emerges 
in Figure 2. Between the first quarter of 1999 and the third 
quarter of 2007, the cumulative annual growth rate of FIRE’s 
share of total market capitalization was 4.9 percent. The rate 
for the Big 4 was 6.7 percent. Between the third quarter of 
2007 and the end of 2009, while FIRE had lost some ground, 
the Big 4 continued to grow at the slightly reduced rate of 
5.3 percent. Within FIRE, the Big 4’s differential growth 
increased from 1.7 percent to 5.4 percent. From the perspec-
tive of Nitzan and Bichler’s theory of capital as power, the Big 
4 have jointly grown more powerful over the period of sup-
posed financial crisis. How have they achieved this? Unfortu-
nately, the answers to that question escape us at the moment. 
The only thing we can say for certain is that the answer will 
not be found solely in either the realm of labour and produc-
tion or some unknowable realm of universal and homoge-
neous human desire. Instead, it will require the far-reaching 
consideration of a myriad of social institutions, including the 
regimen of moral codes. Setting the stage for such an analysis 
means considering how moral codes have factored into the 
establishment of value and the role they play in accumulation. 
Nitzan and Bichler have argued that the distinction 
between politics and economics is meaningless from the 
perspective of accumulation, as the institutions and social 
practices typically assigned to the realm of politics become a 
part of capital when they contribute to processes of accu-
mulation.5 Similarly, systems of morality are indistinguish-
able from the economy. Moralizing discourses can be seen 
through the entirety of American political and economic 
history, and debt acts as the focal point of that discourse. 
The word subprime reveals how the moral discourse of debt 
disciplines debtors and keeps them within the sphere of assets 
that make accumulation possible.
President and new administration – why don’t you put up a website to have people 
vote on the internet, as a referendum to see if we  really want to subsidize the losers’ 
mortgages? This is America! 
—Rick Santelli, CNBC analyst, 
live from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
Introduction
The word subprime seemingly came from nowhere. After 
eleven years of circulating almost exclusively in the busi-
ness pages, ‘subprime’ showed up in a front-page headline 
of a major American daily for the first time on February 20, 
2007 in the Denver Post. Current use of subprime typically 
describes a type of loan or a type of lender, but the word 
actually designates the borrower. Prime refers to the qualities 
of a borrower who has met the standards of credit lenders, 
while subprime borrowers fall short of those criteria. These 
standards divide borrowers into winners and losers and must 
be understood as part of American moral codes of obligation 
and personal responsibility, which play an important role in 
capital accumulation. Examination of the word subprime and 
its relation to other financial operations allows us to see how 
morality functions as part of the capitalist financial architec-
ture. Subprime is first deployed in the extension of credit to 
designate a sub-class of borrowers who are vulnerable and 
therefore risky. The recent financial crisis, better understood 
as a crisis-for-some, was precipitated by the pursuit and 
capture of ever more of these borrowers. This endeavour was 
motivated by the higher returns associated with risky borrow-
ers and justified  by the belief that new financial instruments 
had made the high risk more manageable. Once the term 
had been invented, it then operated within the interactions 
among borrowers, lenders and other relevant institutions to 
protect the value the new debts that constituted assets for the 
lender. A propensity to moralize can be found in the language 
of both debt-collectors, who harangue defaulters to honour 
their debts, and the pundits, who decry efforts to assist the 
losers. In both instances, it functions to protect the asset-
values of the lenders. 
This description of how moralization functions as a 
feature of capitalism is based on an entirely different under-
standing: it considers capitalism as a mode of power rather 
than a mode of production. 
3
‘Purifying the 
mercantile air.’
Among the American founding fa-
thers, lending at interest was largely 
uncontroversial as long as the rates 
were reasonable and the borrowed 
funds were for productive purposes. 
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The Puritans effected an important 
moral shift by levying condemnation 
for non-productive borrowing squarely 
upon the borrower. For example, the 
preacher Cotton Mather ridiculed 
those who “bring Debts upon them-
selves, in such a manner, and in such 
a measure, that Folly nothing short of 
Criminal, is to charged upon them.”6 
(Similar objections were expressed by 
secular intellectuals such as Thomas 
Paine. Their view was that “credit made 
freely available... encouraged people to 
spend beyond their means, to consume 
rather than invest.”7) Despite Mather’s 
objections to certain purposes of 
indebtedness, the communal aspects 
of his Calvinist theology came through 
with an invocation of the debtor’s plea 
from Matthew 18:26: “Have patience 
with me, and I will pay thee all I owe.” 
Where Mather urged the creditor to 
show some compassion and be willing, 
for the sake of the country, to forgive 
some debts, fellow preacher Samuel 
Moody, argued that “failure to pay one’s 
earthly creditors created... a spiritual 
debt.”8 Moody expressed the dual na-
ture of the debt relationship—financial 
and moral—that would form the pivot 
in arguments for and against bank-
ruptcy laws.
Efforts to establish a federal 
bankruptcy law began with the US 
Bankruptcy Act, passed in 1800 and re-
pealed in 1803. A second act passed in 
1841 was repealed two years later. The 
issue exposed a deep divide within pub-
lic and among politicians. On one side 
were those who felt it morally wrong 
to absolve debtors; on the other were 
those who felt it economically wrong 
to force men to endure an irredeem-
able debt, stymieing their productive 
potential. An attempted compromise 
position was advanced by those in the 
second camp. The sponsor of the 1841 
bill asserted, “Let the moral obligation 
remain... It is the legal liability only 
which is touched.”9 This contributed 
to the decidedly American myth of the 
discharged debtor who makes good and 
goes back to honour his moral debt. 
Not every thinker of the era 
retained moral sentimentality toward 
the debt relation. Jeremy Bentham 
justified the complete removal of inter-
est ceilings and accused those making 
moral arguments against usury10 of 
relying on “blind custom” which lacks 
“anything of steadiness or unifor-
mity.”11 Bentham’s individualism led to 
the stance that no lender or borrower 
ought to be restricted from entering 
on any terms into what he considered a 
strictly economic relationship. He was 
theoretically astute and cognizant of 
actual debt relations in his observation 
that a borrower who is unable to find 
a lender at the rates prescribed by the 
law may end up borrowing on even 
more disadvantageous terms in the 
black market.12 Bentham’s ideas had 
influence among sections of the Ameri-
can business class. One writer observed 
that the “mere moral obligations to pay 
money” were contrary to the utilitar-
ian maxim that “the good of the few 
must yield to the good of the many.”13 
However, such opinions were hardly 
the in the majority at the time, given 
the short lives of the first two federal 
bankruptcy acts.
Regardless of how the debt-
relationship was being constructed in 
terms both moral and economic, the 
debates demonstrate the creation and 
reordering of the institutions of debt 
and morality.  Despite attempts by 
some businessmen to distinguish an 
economic realm dictated by rationali-
ty and efficiency, morality remained a 
vital feature of the debt-relationship in 
both discourse and practice.
One of the most important in-
novations of the 19th century moral 
economy of debt was the credit bureau. 
Founded in 1841, the Mercantile 
Agency was the first business whose ex-
plicit mission was to sell “information 
with regard to the credit and affairs of 
every man of business.” According to 
Scott Sandage, the agency “established 
itself as a national bureau of standards 
for judging winners and losers.”14 The 
agency’s founder, abolitionist Lewis 
Tappan, explicitly sought to bring 
morality back into the marketplace. 
He believed that business surveil-
lance “checks knavery, & purifies the 
mercantile air.”15 Although the bureau 
was established during the ‘avalanche 
of printed numbers,’ when individuals 
were being categorized and enumer-
ated in social statistics,16 it relied on 
qualitative reports as “Americans had 
not learned to think of one another 
as mere numbers.”17 Tappan initially 
relied on his network of fellow anti-
slavery activists, who also subscribed 
to strong moral codes but were 
well-placed in the world of business. 
Reporters for the agency would send 
detailed reports on the ‘three ‘C’s’ of 
an individual—capital, character and 
capacity. Through such assessment, 
Tappan believed future creditors could 
judge someone’s potential and there-
fore determine what level of risk could 
be taken in the extension of credit. The 
system institutionalized the moral 
judgments that were vital components 
of business transactions. 
In his decision to focus on more 
than an individual’s money holdings, 
Tappan was instrumentalizing the 
popular adage that “character is the 
poor man’s capital.”18 Character was of 
great concern for American public in-
tellectuals. The word brought together 
republican and individualist strands in 
American values. Character was the key 
to individual success, although it obvi-
ously depended upon the assessment 
of the community. A man of character 
earned the goodwill of  others. This 
attitude was displayed by J. P. Morgan 
during his testimony before the 1912 
Pujo Committee investigating the 
‘money trust’ on Wall Street, when he 
told committee members that more 
than “money or property” a borrower 
gets credit “on his character.”19
Debt was a fully entrenched fea-
ture of the American social landscape. 
However, it was frowned upon in all 
instances except for expansion and 
productivity. In the century of debates 
about bankruptcy laws, the distinction 
between loans for productive purposes 
and other uses was rendered into a 
moral-economic distinction. The dis-
tinction identified debt discharge as a 
“boon reserved for capitalist entrepre-
neurs, while simpler debtors should... 
remember the sanctity of their 
obligations.”20 This distinction finally 
allowed bankruptcy relief to become a 
permanent feature in American law in 
1898, right before consumer debt was 
about to take off.
4
Inventing the 
productive consumer
The debates over bankruptcy laws had been a duel between 
those who wished to preserve the moral relations of debt and 
those who wished to regard the relationship solely for its 
economic functions. The solution focused on the economic 
virtues of the entrepreneur, retaining the debt stigma 
for all others. However, even as the debates on the moral 
economy of debt were shifting to relieve the entrepreneur 
from moral opprobrium, the entrepreneur was disappearing 
from the American business landscape. John D. Rockefeller 
announced the arrival of Big Business, declaring, “Individu-
alism has gone, never to return.”21 The meaning of success 
would have to change. Big Business needed a class of trained 
clerks to run the large operations under the control of mo-
nopoly capitalists.22 This class could not consider their tech-
nocratic lives to be inferior, falling short of the realization of 
the American Dream. The dream had to be reinvented. “The 
new dream acquiesced to wage labor. It was financed by debt. 
It hoped for liberation and fulfillment through a culture of 
abundance.”23
Consumer debt (renamed consumer credit to remove its 
social stigma) was not new. However, with the reconfigura-
tion of the American dream, it reached unprecedented levels. 
The growing scale and technological capability of American 
industry were turning out larger and larger quantities of 
more and more household conveniences. American busi-
ness used consumer credit to create markets for these goods. 
General Motors overtook Ford in the early part of the 20th 
century partly because of Ford’s refusal to offer consumer 
credit. This refusal stemmed directly from Henry Ford’s 
moral objection to debt. GM, unconstrained by moral consid-
erations, formed the General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
(GMAC), which provided lending to both dealers and consum-
ers. Ford implemented a lay-away plan that “promoted the 
most conservative conceptions of thrift, savings, and delay 
of gratification.”24 Automobiles were only the largest of debt 
financed purchases. By 1930, well over half of all furniture, 
washing machines, vacuum cleaners, radios and phonographs 
were purchased on instalment plans.25 Instalment plan 
spending grew at a terrific pace, outstripping the booming 
gross national product by 8.7 percentage points annually.26 
All of this spending required a further moral shift in attitudes 
towards debt and consumer spending. 
At the turn of the century, loans were primarily reserved 
for those who already had money. The middle and lower 
classes had little access to credit. When they did need credit, 
they were forced, as Bentham predicted, into the usurious 
arms of the loan shark. Progressives, arguing from a moral 
stance of equality, worked to change usury laws as part of an 
effort to broaden access to credit. The changes paved the way 
for former loan sharking operations to become legitimate 
businesses. Although illegal lenders continued to operate, 
the newly legitimate side of small loan provision—renamed 
industrial lenders—worked to justify its business, even polic-
ing their former black market colleagues.27 They invoked 
the productive individual entrepreneur but combined him 
with republican ideals. The small loan financiers put their 
emphasis on industrial harmony and the common good. They 
portrayed themselves as benevolent providers of a community 
resource in short supply. Their borrowers were idealized as 
modest people with great ideas, in need of a small financial 
boost. This discourse was clearly at odds with the realities 
and requirements of rapidly spreading business at ever larger 
scales. In 1929, the American Industrial Lenders Association 
restored balance to the discourse by changing its name to the 
American Association of Personal Finance Companies.
The move by small loan finance companies away from 
the productivity claims within the moralizing discourse of 
debt was not universally shared. Big bankers voiced objec-
tions to small loans and instalment finance. Such objections 
were indicative of the inherent conservativism of bankers. 
The credit that became consumer debt did not originate with 
the banks, and they were materially powerless to prevent or 
restrict it. However, they were respected community figures 
who frequently spoke out against consumer credit. Their 
primary concern was the effect that consumer debt would 
have on savings, the source of their capital. A vice-president 
of the Bank of Pittsburgh invoked republican ideals and 
declared that the small loan provider “perverts” the com-
mon desire for a “safe tomorrow” by fanning the individual’s 
“desire for possessions” and therefore “is an economic traitor 
to his country.”28 The bankers helped produce a backlash 
against consumer credit in the 1920s, with one businessman 
lamenting that easy credit was “breaking down the whole 
morale of the nation.” Even marriage was debased as wedding 
rings could be had for “$2 down, $1 a week!”29 The discourse 
shaped the practices of lending and borrowing. For example, 
many avoided borrowing because of the continued existence 
of stigma. The terms of lending would have been influenced 
by bank recrimination. An investigation of where instalment 
spending was most popular could offer insight into who was 
persuaded by the various moralizing debates. 
The defence of small loans and instalment credit came 
in the form of a study by economist E.R.A. Seligman. Funded 
by GMAC, the study marked an early instance of the develop-
ing relationship between American Big Business and the 
academy. The study had been suggested by a GM board mem-
ber who recognized that its results would be a win-win for 
GM. Should Seligman determine that instalment selling was 
contributing to economic growth, then the company could 
tout its contributions to the practice. If he instead criticized 
consumer credit, then GMAC could profit by restricting lend-
ing and implementing terms favourable to its bottom line.30 
In the end, Seligman exonerated instalment selling. Although 
he structured his defence in economic terms, he necessarily 
considered elements of the moral attacks on debt. The most 
interesting part of Seligman’s defense is his attack on the 
moral critique that distinguished productive debt from its 
prodigal counterpart, consumptive debt. Seligman argued 
that all credit is necessarily productive: the money spent by 
consumers serves to fund the productive efforts of indus-
try just as much as credit extended directly to producers.31 
Because of the difficulties of distinguishing between end, he 
suggested making distinctions based on the recipient: credit 
should be categorized as producers’ credit and consumers’ 
credit. Seligman was challenging that the distinction between 
production and consumption, which is fundamental to both 
mainstream and Marxist economics. He effectively erased the 
line that had exempted some debt from moral censure.
These debates were quickly followed by the Great 
Depression. The dramatic event provoked a wave of criticisms 
against instalment credit that produced “mischievous moral, 
social and economic effects.”32 The claim was that debt pro-
duced levels of consumption beyond what the populace could 
sustain. However, the drastic and unprecedented decline in 
output did not cause defenders of instalment finance to back 
down. Instead, they asserted that instalment credit actually 
kept the decline from being worse.33 Of course, criticisms 
of consumer over-consumption continued. In fact, together 
with Republican concern over rising levels of debt, this criti-
cism has marked the 20th century of American moralization 
of debt. Although the 1970s brought the innovation of the 
credit card, it did not generate a new ethic of debt, as many 
claim.34 Rather, as Louis Hyman argues, “Credit card compa-
nies appropriated and extended a debt infrastructure already 
in place.”35 This infrastructure included the moral attitudes 
toward debt.
5 
Contemporary crises and 
the subprime loser.
Until the late 1980s and early 
1990s, mortgage lenders tried to reduce 
risk by rationing credit and extending 
loans only to borrowers with perfect or 
near-perfect credit assessments – the 
so-called prime borrower. This was 
meant to reduce default rates and pro-
tect the value of the debt-asset. Patricia 
McCoy and Elizabeth Renuart identify 
four innovations within the lending 
market that changed this practice:
1
Regulatory changes allowed lenders to charge a risk pre-
mium to less creditworthy borrowers and to market more 
complex debt instruments. This increased the pool of eligible 
borrowers who could be transformed into debt-assets. These 
high-risk borrowers would also come with higher rates of 
return, something market participants seek constantly.
2
New technologies made statistical credit scoring models and 
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Alongside these legislative, 
technological and finance industry 
changes was debt’s constant discursive 
companion: moralization. This essay 
examines three case studies to dem-
onstrate how moralizing discourses 
are deployed as part of the finance 
industry’s efforts to protect debt-assets. 
First, it examines how sentiments 
of community and trust were used 
within minority communities, which 
were disproportionately targeted by 
subprime lenders. Second, it considers 
debt collection practices that appeal 
to both individualist and republican 
ideals. Third, it considers the density of 
payday lenders in areas where citizens’ 
moral codes are likely to be susceptible 
to creditor appeals.
The naming of riskier borrowers 
as subprime had an obvious instru-
mental purpose: it distinguished their 
pertinent credit information and 
guided the terms of their debt-rela-
tionship. However, it also drew upon 
the credit bureau’s process of ranking 
and labeling. Early credit reports were 
descriptive and non-standardized. 
Many of their descriptive terms became 
moralistic proclamations as they 
intersected with public discourse: good 
for nothing, A1, small fry, dead beat.37 
The prime/subprime distinction follows 
on the credit bureau’s designation of 
people as first, second or third rate, ac-
cording to their capital, character and 
capacity. The location of a person in a 
hierarchy of quality was meant to aid 
in setting credit terms.
The credit agency was founded 
upon the ideal of objectively locat-
ing a person’s true identity. Sandage 
notes that the Mercantile Agency’s 
storefront was near two other business 
that shared the goal of “observing, 
recording, and selling the distinctive 
traits of individuals:” the daguerreo-
type and the phrenologist.38 Character 
was assessed as an objective feature of 
the person. Barry Cohen observes that 
“[c] haracter lost its salience as a defin-
ing term for assessing credit in part 
because good character was both fairly 
universal as well as stable, which made 
it lose its market value.”39 While the 
focus moved to the more observable 
and quantifiable facts relevant to the 
debt-relationship, moral assessment 
remained. Observable quantities stood 
in for character; a man’s qualities be-
came synonymous with his quantities.
The prime/subprime distinction 
emerged in an era when all the quanti-
ties of the individual were distilled into 
a single number: the FICO score. The 
line between the most and least worthy 
exists at a discrete value: 620. However, 
the line was not strictly observed. 
Certain demographic classes were 
disproportionately designated as sub-
prime. In particular, African-Americans, 
Hispanics, women, disabled people and 
the elderly were targeted as subprime 
even if objectively qualified as prime 
borrowers.40
The relationship between 
creditors and people of colour has 
long been contentious. Well into the 
20th century, there were no laws 
against lending discrimination on 
the basis of race. Banks engaged in a 
practice known as redlining. Residents 
from minority neighbourhoods were 
automatically denied loans. As the 
accumulatory struggle of the finance 
industry led it to the creation of more 
debt-assets, it required more debtors. 
The more debtors enroled at subprime 
rates, the greater the potential rate of 
return. With the end of credit rationing, 
redlines served a new purpose: they 
attracted subprime lenders. Minority 
communities, traditionally under-
served by mainstream commercial 
banks,41 have many reasons to be wary 
of mainstream lenders, not least the 
legacy of discrimination. 
Recent minority lending prac-
tices have played on moral themes of 
community and trust. By physically 
operating within minority neighbour-
hoods, employing members of minority 
groups and presenting their lending 
options as the only option, subprime 
lenders represented themselves as 
performing a community service. They 
appealed to community-mindedness 
and a long tradition of treating credit 
extension as a favour.42 Even without 
direct evidence, it is not hard to imag-
ine that lenders knew of the general 
mistrust of traditional banks. Their 
appeals to potential debtors could play 
upon this mistrust. Their self-portrayal 
as a local alternative obscured the fact 
would sell debt to a commercial bank 
for repackaging into securities. The 
transformation of a borrower with 
prime qualities, and hence at low risk 
of default, into a subprime individual, 
subject to higher interest rates, prepay-
ment penalties, and more complicated 
terms, increased the value of the indi-
vidual as an asset. Moralizing discourse 
around community and trust worked 
to perform this transformation. The 
debtor, unaware of his or her quantita-
tive status—a FICO score over 620—
could be dissuaded from seeking more 
personally advantageous borrowing 
terms by an appeal to his or her sense 
of community. The need to repay the 
debt comes from the same community 
mindedness. This may work to reduce 
the risk of default, or at least to keep 
payments flowing as long as possible 
before default occurs. In the event of 
default, it becomes the debt collectors’ 
turn to entice repayment, and moral-
izing discourse is the base from which 
collection efforts begin.
The US has laws against debt col-
lection practices such as using abusive 
language, making repeated calls within 
a short timeframe and revealing the 
details of debt to third parties. Of these 
practices, only the revelation of debt to 
third parties has an explicitly moral-
izing element. In the documentary 
Maxed Out, a debt collector talks about 
the practice and claims incorrectly 
that it is not illegal. The purpose of 
these revelations, as explained by two 
separate collectors, is to embarrass the 
debtor. Both collectors employ this 
tactic early in their collection efforts 
if they are having a hard time getting 
in touch with the debtor. The sense 
of shame is supposed to motivate 
payment. This tactic appeals to sense 
of community and to the value of 
personal responsibility. Individuals 
are made ashamed of their failure to 
live up to commitments. Insults are 
frequently rooted in claims that the 
debtor is a moral failure. Almost 150 
years after the credit bureau invented 
the term dead beat, debt collectors 
continue to apply it. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson asserted 
that “nobody fails who ought not to 
fail. There is always a reason, in the 
man.” As Scott Sandage notes, this 
dictum “combined market logic and 
moral creed.”43 It is the individualist 
ideal at its purest. The failure to live 
up to the ideal is also meant to induce 
shame that derives from one’s partici-
pation in a community. The seeming 
conundrum of American individualism 
and republicanism is resolved in the 
concern over debt and the obliga-
tions to repayment individuals take 
upon themselves. Far from a simple 
economic relationship, debt collectors 
wrench earnings from borrowers by 
appealing to their moral codes.
 Two extraordinary papers by 
Steven Graves and Christopher Peter-
son examine moral codes and debt. In 
“Predatory Lending and the Military,” 
the pair examines the high density 
of payday lenders around US military 
bases.xliv This research actually led the 
military to lobby Congress for a 2006 
law that protects military person-
nel from the usurious rates charged 
by payday lenders.45. In “Usury Law 
and the Christian Right,” Graves and 
Peterson show that areas with strongly 
observant fundamentalist Christian 
populations also tend to have greater 
numbers of payday lenders.46 The pair 
refrains from suggesting why these re-
lationships exist. However, it may have 
to do with the existing moral codes of 
the targeted populations. Both Chris-
tian and military organizations appeal 
to moral codes that draw on the dual 
American values of individual and re-
publican responsibility. The US Army’s 
former slogan, ‘An Army of One,’ cap-
tured both sides of the American ideal: 
the army is a single unit, composed of 
single units. Without the individual, 
there is no army; without the army 
there is no individual. Fundamental-
ist Christian doctrine embraces both 
individualistic free market ideology and 
community-minded adherence to the 
message of Christ. A sense of obligation 
and personal responsibility is likely a 
major component of the moral codes 
for both American soldiers and funda-
mentalist Christians. This makes them 
ideal borrowers; they are likely to do 
everything possible to meet their debt 
and repayment obligations. 
Accumulation is a complex 
process. It cannot be reduced to any 
one facet of society, not even labour 
and production. In their struggle to 
accumulate, capitalists will leverage 
any institution, including existing 
moral codes. To understand how 
capitalists realize profits from property, 
then every ordering mechanism under 
their control, including moralizing 
discourse, must be examined.
6
Conclusion
The recent subprime mortgage crisis combines three words 
that trace interesting discursive and practical histories within 
the institutions of Western capitalism. 
Crisis. Many like to claim that the Chinese word for 
crisis—weiji—includes the word opportunity as one of its 
component parts. This fallacious piece of Orientalism demon-
strates a feature of the capitalist mindset. The current state of 
the Western political economy has provoked an unmitigated 
crisis for those at the bottom of the hierarchy, who are expe-
riencing foreclosure, unemployment and other attendant ills 
of a downturn. However, the experience is different for those 
at the top. For them, the crisis has truly been an opportunity. 
Although Citibank and Bank of America lost common equity 
value, their survival through US government intercession 
foretells the potential for even greater success, profit and 
power. Differentially, the Big 4 have gained against their FIRE 
compatriots. A crisis of capitalism will only come in the form 
of a threat to the legitimacy of capital as a mechanism of vend-
ible ownership and control. Short of that, every crisis presents 
a differential opportunity and will only be a crisis for some.
Mortgage. Mort gage: Death grip. The actual etymo-
logical history of the word does not reveal the appealing 
literal translation that serves as this article’s title. Gage was 
more properly understood as ‘pledge.’ The original roots of 
‘mortgage’ may have described the low likelihood that the 
debtor, having pledged his property against the debt, would 
ever make full repayment. In today’s context of interest-
only payments, 2-28 adjustable rate mortgages, and other 
mechanisms that have proved too burdensome for many, the 
translation of this word as death grip is appropriate. Given 
the desirability for owners of debt-assets to keep people in-
debted, barely making interest payments, only death becomes 
the horizon of release.
Subprime. Like a scarlet letter, the label subprime 
denotes the unworthy, those not deserving of the choicest of 
rates and those deemed risky and financially unsavoury. How-
ever, subprime borrowers were desirable. Lenders went out of 
their way to attain these high-return assets, reverse redlining 
and courting subprime clients. They salivated at the prospect 
of rolled-over debt, unending interest-only payments subject 
to skyrocketing rates and default and resale while prices were 
rising. Demand for securities backed by subprime loans rose 
drastically as investors sought to beat the average and earn 
the slightly greater margin. Of course, the differential struggle 
proved a bust for some. The jump in interest rates provoked 
by the Federal Reserve and  the upward adjustment of rates on 
large numbers of 2-28 mortgages led to a wave of defaults. Mar-
ket participants fled from these tainted securities even though 
four-fifths of subprime borrowers continue to make payments 
and more might have done so with renegotiation. Between 
falling housing prices and second mortgages, many subprime 
borrowers are now carrying negative equity. For them, it would 
make financial sense to walk away from their loans. A certain 
percentage will be allowed to fail, mainly from the five percent 
of borrowers with subprime adjustable rate mortgages. The 
rest will be made grateful for the opportunity to renegotiate: 
lenders will tout their own good deeds and community service, 
their concern for the borrower and their wish to enable correct 
behaviour. Overdue payments will be tacked on as principal. 
The foreclosed will be tokens of ‘there but for the Grace of 
God.’ Eventually the precipice over which many peered will 
fade, and the reason for failure will again be found ‘in the man.’ 
It is unclear how finance will react. The technologies that 
made the targeting of subprime individuals possible remain in 
place. The legal apparatus will certainly change. The subprime 
individual remains assessed as such. In fact, many more of us 
are likely to be branded subprime, or its post-crisis equivalent, 
and be forced to acquiesce to punitive terms. That lenders will 
seek to transform our low standing into high return debt-
relationships seems certain, as the quest for accumulation is 
unending. The precise form the new debt-relationship will take, 
and the effect it will have on borrowers is uncertain.
Debtors as assets are treated just like every other asset 
in terms of their contribution to accumulation. They are capi-
talized based on expected earnings, discounted for risk. This 
makes them divisible and vendible through securitization. 
Prior to the recent crisis, subprime debt-assets were highly 
valued both because of 1) their potential for higher earning 
streams due to interest-only payments, prepayment penalties, 
long amortization periods and other mechanisms and 2) low 
assessed risk due to belief in the effectiveness of technologi-
cally informed risk management through securitization. The 
crisis provoked a drastic downward revaluation as the risk 
perceptions associated with subprime borrowers moved high-
er. However, like every other asset, the qualitative processes 
that determine earnings are particular and unique. There 
is no reduction from observable quantities to unobservable 
quantities. Instead, as Nitzan and Bichler argue: “To under-
stand capitalism… is to decipher the link between quality and 
quantity, to reduce the multifaceted nature of social power to 
the universal appearance of capital accumulation.47
Debt-assets may be alone in the direct role that morali-
zing discourses can play in both generating and protecting 
value. This examination of moralization within the debt- 
relationship focuses on fairly insignificant players in terms 
of the hierarchy of capitalist power. No subprime lender, 
payday lender or debt collection agency is among the Fortune 
500. However, these entities play essential roles in the value 
creation and protection that contributes to the power of 
financial companies at top of the corporate hierarchy. Moral-
izing is just one more instrument in the re-ordering of power 
that constitutes the accumulatory struggle within capitalism. 
Subject to the scapegoating of the pundits, most of those in 
debt undoubtedly feel a responsibility to meet their financial 
obligations and remain within the death grip. When this scape-
goating combines with the personal-level interactions of the 
debt-relationship, including both moralizing discourses and 
refinancing on new terms, many debtors will choose adher-
ence to their moral codes of republican and individual virtue, 
including their military and Christian varieties, over the libera-
tion from debt that would come with default and bankruptcy. 
Debtors will remain valuable assets for the owners of debt 
while moral codes persist within the capitalist architecture.
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